Recently, there have been frequent stock auctions for small and medium-sized banks, but there are few successful cases, and there are even many cases where discounts are still being sold. Regarding the frequent circulation of small and medium-sized bank equity auctions, what should banks do to reduce the negative impact on themselves? Wang Pengbo, a senior analyst in the financial industry at Broadcom, put forward three suggestions: the first is to clarify the hierarchy of insured shareholders, distinguish between large shareholders and scattered small and medium-sized shareholders, connect with judicial resolution agencies in advance for shareholders with high shareholding volume issues, sort out alternative equity transfer subjects, shorten the auction cycle as much as possible, and avoid accumulating negative public opinion. Second, it is necessary to routinely disclose the underlying causes of equity changes to the outside world, make it clear that the risk belongs to individual shareholders rather than the bank's asset quality and operating fundamentals, and stabilize the expectations of the market, depositors, and industry partners. Finally, it is necessary to comprehensively investigate existing shareholder-related loans, tighten the approval rules for related transactions, gradually reduce the high proportion of related credit grants, and cut off the channel for shareholders' debt risk transmission to bank credit assets.

Recently, there have been frequent stock auctions for small and medium-sized banks, but there are few successful cases, and there are even many cases where discounts are still being sold. Regarding the frequent circulation of small and medium-sized bank equity auctions, what should banks do to reduce the negative impact on themselves? Wang Pengbo, a senior analyst in the financial industry at Broadcom, put forward three suggestions: the first is to clarify the hierarchy of insured shareholders, distinguish between large shareholders and scattered small and medium-sized shareholders, connect with judicial resolution agencies in advance for shareholders with high shareholding volume issues, sort out alternative equity transfer subjects, shorten the auction cycle as much as possible, and avoid accumulating negative public opinion. Second, it is necessary to routinely disclose the underlying causes of equity changes to the outside world, make it clear that the risk belongs to individual shareholders rather than the bank's asset quality and operating fundamentals, and stabilize the expectations of the market, depositors, and industry partners. Finally, it is necessary to comprehensively investigate existing shareholder-related loans, tighten the approval rules for related transactions, gradually reduce the high proportion of related credit grants, and cut off the channel for shareholders' debt risk transmission to bank credit assets.