A new regulatory regulation that is about to reshape the incentive ecosystem in the public fund industry is drawing great attention from the market. According to the “Performance Assessment Management Guidelines for Fund Management Companies” issued a few days ago, the remuneration of active equity fund managers will be deeply linked to their long-term performance, and a rigid “reward and punishment” mechanism will be set up, pointing to the problem of “fund managers who don't make money.” The opinion paper makes it clear that if active equity fund managers lose the performance benchmark by 10 percentage points in three years and the fund's profit margin is lost, performance pay will face a mandatory reduction of at least 30%; conversely, if performance significantly exceeds the benchmark and profits are reasonable, salary increases can be made. According to Wind statistics, as of December 5, more than 1,400 active equity products had outperformed the benchmark by 10 percentage points in the past three years, involving nearly 1,000 fund managers. Among them, products managed by well-known fund managers such as Shi Cheng, Liu Yanchun, Liu Geyi, and Zhang Kun are clearly on the list, or are under pressure to cut salaries. According to industry insiders, this indicates that the long-term incentive and restraint mechanism for the public fund industry is about to enter the stage of substantial implementation, pushing the industry to truly return to the roots of “being trusted by others and managing wealth on behalf of customers.” A profound transformation around “putting holders' interests first” is already under way.

A new regulatory regulation that is about to reshape the incentive ecosystem in the public fund industry is drawing great attention from the market. According to the “Performance Assessment Management Guidelines for Fund Management Companies” issued a few days ago, the remuneration of active equity fund managers will be deeply linked to their long-term performance, and a rigid “reward and punishment” mechanism will be set up, pointing to the problem of “fund managers who don't make money.” The opinion paper makes it clear that if active equity fund managers lose the performance benchmark by 10 percentage points in three years and the fund's profit margin is lost, performance pay will face a mandatory reduction of at least 30%; conversely, if performance significantly exceeds the benchmark and profits are reasonable, salary increases can be made. According to Wind statistics, as of December 5, more than 1,400 active equity products had outperformed the benchmark by 10 percentage points in the past three years, involving nearly 1,000 fund managers. Among them, products managed by well-known fund managers such as Shi Cheng, Liu Yanchun, Liu Geyi, and Zhang Kun are clearly on the list, or are under pressure to cut salaries. According to industry insiders, this indicates that the long-term incentive and restraint mechanism for the public fund industry is about to enter the stage of substantial implementation, pushing the industry to truly return to the roots of “being trusted by others and managing wealth on behalf of customers.” A profound transformation around “putting holders' interests first” is already under way.